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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FLORENCE~ANDERSO~ 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
LAMAR ANDERSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Oase No. 8169 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Lal\1ar Anderson, defendant and appellant, herein-
after referred to as the husband, rand Florence J. Ander-
son, plaintiff and respondent, hereinafter referred to 
as the wife, were married one to the other at Seattle, 
State of Washington, on July 16, 1936. Two sons, Craig 
and Brent, 'and two daughters, Diane and Michele, were 
begotten by them during said marriage. On the 26th day 
of September, 1949, in the Third Judicial District Court, 
State of Utah, the marriage contract was abrogated by 
interlocutory divorce decree •and the parties went their 
separate ways. The above mentioned begotten children 
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there and at that time ranged in age from eleven to 
four years, and their custody was awarded the wife with 
certain rights thereto reserved to the husband. \Ve are 
not heTe concerned ·with matters pertaining to the marital 
relationship, the custodial decreement, nor the separation 
of the wife and husband. 
The issues in this cause arise from subsequent pro-
ceedings had in the above referred to Third District 
Court, the results of which were, as to the husband, a 
rnoney judgment in the wife's favor in the sum of $4,484.-
41 for back support monies, $125.00 attorneys' fees and 
costs, coupled with a thirty-day sentence of incarceration 
in the county jail, suspended subject to certain conditions. 
On August 11th, 1952, the wife through counsel petitioned 
the court for an order to show cause (R. 17), said order 
issued (R. 19), and the husband filed his cross petition 
(R. 21); on August 26th, 1952, the court issued findings, 
conclusions and its order as above stated. Thereafter, 
upon affidavit of the wife (R. 29, 30), alleging the hus-
band to be $200.00 in arrears of payment as of February 
lOth, 1953, the court, I-Ionorable Clarence E. Baker 
presiding, ordered the husband's incarceration (R. 30). 
The husband petitioned the court to vacate the order 
and strike the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
of August 26, 1952, and vacate the order of February 10, 
1953 (R. 31); an order to show cauRe thereon issued 1Iay 
4, 1953 (R. 35) ; and, on February 5, 1954, the court en-
tered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order (R. 37, 84, 86), dismissing said petition. Of this 
we complain. 
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The husband is not now, and he has at no time been, 
in arrears in the payment of support monies. The terms 
of the divorce decree and of the agreement of the parties 
thereto, therein incorporated and made a part thereof, 
were never violated by the husband. To the contrary, the 
husband has taken it upon himself to do, and has done, 
considerably more financially for the wife and the four 
minor children than said decree ordered and adjudged. 
~rhese allegations are amply supported by the record. 
On September lOth, 1949, the wife and the husband 
entered into a "Stipulation and Agreement" (R. 4), 
fair, reasonable and equitable in all respects, dividing 
between them the joint property by them accumulated as 
a result of their joint efforts as husband and wife. The 
wife, in her complaint for divorce, prayed for the ap-
proval of said stipulation and agreement dividing their 
properties and providing for the support of their chil-
dren (R. 2); to this the trial judge consented and in turn 
ordered that each perform thereunder the respective obli-
gations imposed upon each therein and that the support 
of the minor children of the parties be paid as provided 
therein. This agreement is a part of the record, pages 4 
through 10 thereof; we shall refer herein only to the parts 
thereof which are pertinent to the instant issue. How-
ever, in consideration of this cause, this court will no 
doubt apprise itself as to the complete fairness of the 
entire settlement. Pursuant to the provisions of Para-
graph 4 of said stipulation 1and agreement, it was agreed 
by the wife and the husband that the husband should pay 
to the wife ''the sum of $200.00 per month as support 
3 
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money for the minor children of the parties, said pay-
ments to begin and cmnmence as hereinafter set forth." 
(Emphasis added.) Paragraph 5 (R. 8) of said stipu-
lation and agreement provides that certain income prop-
erty situated in Phoenix, Arizonra, should be sold, one-
half of the net proceeds to become the property of the 
wife in full payment and satisfaction of alimony, and 
that the other one-half of the net proceeds thereof was to 
be the property of the husband to be placed in trust with 
a trust company in Phoenix, Arizona, and to he paid to 
the wife at the rate of $250.00 per month for the support 
and maintenance of the minor children until said fund 
was exhausted, then, the husband ''shall commence to 
pay to the plaintiff, Florence Anderson, the sum of Two 
Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month for the care, sup-
port and maintenance of the minor children herein." 
(Emphasis added.) It was also provided in said Para-
graph 5 that either party might list the said property 
for sale after a date certain and that '' * * * Florence 
Anderson may have the income from said property until 
the same has been sold. '' This property at the commence-
nlent of this action had not been sold nor has it yet been 
sold. That the wife was aware of and fully understood 
the terms of the agreement is beyond doubt substantiated 
by Exhibit '' 2 '' entered in the hearing on the original 
order to show cause; therein she writes ''I understand 
LaMar is working every day now and is doing well, so 
wmtld you :recommend that he pay $200 per month sup-
port for the children until the property sells. * * *'' 
Upon the hearing of the original order to show cause 
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fileJ by the wife, she testified that she had listed the 
property, with which we are here concerned, for sale (R. 
G7); that a realty company had been unable to obtain 
a reasonable offer for the property (R. 67); that she had 
made no money on the rental units (R. 67); that she had 
to pay money out extra ( R. 67) ; that there were hack 
taxes due (R. 67, 68). She offered no books of account 
nor any evidence of receipts, disbursements or profit or 
loss. She testified that she was employed and was earn-
ing $265.00 per month (R. 68); she alleged that in three 
years she had earned $4,219.00 (R. 68). She eontended 
she was $200.00 in debt (R. 69); but on cross-examination, 
she said she owed $30.00 to one department store and 
$60.00 to another department store, and it is not clear 
what she owed on the boy's bicycle since it only appears 
that $60.00 was at one time due on one bicycle and she 
had $15.00 to pay on another (R. 33). She said, "I am 
hopelessly in debt" (R. 68). She said she had an offer of 
$1,500.00 for the property which had been rescinded (R. 
69). She tendered evidence to show that the husband was 
not a fit 'and proper person to have custody of the chil-
dren (R. 70). She denied that she had had an offer to sell 
for $8,000.00 (R. 71), but she had listed it for $10,000.00 
and had been informed by a realtor that she might get 
seven or eight (R. 71). She said the property had been 
appraised at $2,900.00 (R. 72) whether for tax purposes 
or sale is not disclosed. 
The husband testified on the hearing as to his desire 
to have custody of the children one month of the year 
(R. 43, 44); as to his employment (R. 45, 46); as to his 
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inability to work due to ill health (R. 46); as to his 
efforts to effect a sale of the rental units in Phoenix and 
as to the lack of cooperation in such efforts by the wife 
(R. 46, 47, 48, 49, 50). The husband testified that the wife 
told her uncle and himself that she was offered eighty-
five hundred for the property at one time and that she 
refused to take it (R. 48). The husband also stated that 
he was advised by his attorney, the attorney that pre-
pared the settle1nent agreement and represented the wife 
in the divorce action, not to pay the support money (R. 
49). The husband testified as to his knowledge of the 
income in rentals from the propel't)', $150.00 to $180.00 
per month (R. 51). He testified as to his earnings from 
commissions and renewals in the sale of insurance (R. 
57); as to the sale of the hotel property awarded hiln by 
the divorce decree (R. 58); and, that he gave her that 
money (R. 58). On cross-examination, it was elicited 
from this witness that his earnings from his employment 
were about $2,000.00 in 1949, about $2,000.00 in 1950, and 
$3,166.47 minus losses on renewals in 1951 (R. 61). That 
he had paid over $1,700.00 in doctor and hospital bills 
in the past two years (R. 62). That if his health con-
tinued, he could make about $5,000.00 in 1952 (R. 62). 
That he kept his insurance in effect for the benefit of the 
children at a cost of around $60.00 per month (R. 63). 
The testimony of the parties is not without conflict. 
Mr. Keith Bro·wne, Attorney at Law, was called as a 
witness for the defense (R. 75). It is appellant's con-
sidered opinion that the testimony of this witness is im-
material to the cause. 
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It is apparent that the court gave no consideration 
to the agreement ,of the parties; in ruling, the court said: 
"I can see no reason why the defendant can't 
make those payments. He has had earnings suffi-
cient to make them and the defendant is required 
to pay the whole amount of the balance due, 
totaling about $4,800.00, or thereabouts, minus 
whatever the difference was in the sum $2,550.00. 
He should pay that up as promptly as possible, 
and at the conclusion of that payment he should 
pay regularly the sum of $200.00 per month. 
I shall also find that the defendant is in con-
tempt of Court and shall sentence him for such 
contempt to serve thirty days in the County Jail, 
and that sentence will be suspended though on this 
condition: 
That is, that he shall pay the sum of- well, 
I don't know - he has got to pay at least $200.00, 
I would say he can pay $300.00 that is $200.00 on 
the cwrrent accruals of alimony and support 
money, plus $100.00 to apply on this judgment for 
back alimony and support 1noney. As long as he 
pays the $300.00 a month he needn't serve this 
sentence, but when he fails to do so this sentence 
shall be instantly reinstated and may be invoked; 
and he shall also pay an attorney's fee in the sum 
of $125.00, and the costs of the action.'' (emphasis 
added) (R. 79, 80) 
The only reference to the property here involved, made 
by the court, was to the effect that it should be sold im-
mediately (R. 80). 
ARGU11ENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING APPEL, 
LANT'S PETITION TO VACATE THE ORDER AND STRIKE 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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OF AUGUST 26, 1952 AND VACATE I'l'S ORDER OF FEBRU-
ARY 10., 195·3. 
The action commenced in the court below was an 
Order to Show Cause, based upon a divorce decree, which 
plaintiff incorrectly alleged provided for the payment 
of $200.00 per month support n1onies co1n1nencing with 
the entry of said decree, to-wit, September 26, 1949 (R. 
17). The cause was not a petition to modify a decree, 
and the court below erred in altering the terms of the 
original decree which was based upon the facts existent 
at the time it -vvas made. Cody v. Cody, 47 U. 456, 154 P. 
952. So long as the original decree stands, the parties 
are bound by the terms thereof; this court so held a hus-
band, (Osmus v. Osmus, 114 U. 216, 198 P. 2d 233) and a 
wife must also be so held-at least until she pleads and 
proves a change in circumstances such as to require, in 
fairness and equity, a change in the terms of the decree. 
Osmus v. Osmus, supra, and cases there cited. This she 
n1ay do by regular proceedings in an action to modify the 
decree hut such a proceeding cannot be had upon an 
Order to Show Cause why a party should not be held in 
contempt, since the latter can only be based upon a fail-
ure to comply with the terms of an existing decreement. 
We do not here contend, nor are we now called upon 
so to do, that a decree of divorce in which a property 
settlement agreement has been incorporated cannot be 
modified. Our law provides for subsequent changes and 
new orders, 30-3-5 U.C.A. 1953; but not without limita-
tion, and a court cannot change or modify a judgment 
at will. 
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In the instant case, the decree of divorce provides, 
in part: 
"4. That the plaintiff, Florence J. Anderson 
be not awarded any alimony and that henceforth 
she not be entitled to any; the said plaintiff, hav-
ing in her stipulation with the defendant, elected 
to receive a cash award as alimony and as and for 
complete settlement of the same as provided in 
said stipulation. 
* * * 
''6. And it is further ordered that the provi-
sions of said stipulation and each and every one 
of them, be and the same hereby are incorporated 
into this decree by this reference and made a part 
hereof and that each of said parties receive the 
respective shares agreed upon therein and that 
each perform the respective obligations imposed 
upon each therein and that the support of the 
minor children of the parties be paid as provided 
therein.'' (Emphasis added) 
(R. 16) 
The stipulation and agreement, the terms of which the 
court ordered the parties to comply with provides: 
'' 5. It is further agreed between the parties, 
subject to the approval of the Court, that the 
property described in subparagraph (c) of para-
graph 3 of this stipulation shall be sold, and that 
either of the parties may list the same for sale 
after October 1, 1949, and that the plaintiff, 
Florence Anderson, may have the income from 
said property until the same has been sold. 
"It is agreed between the parties hereto that 
the one-half ( 1!2) of the net sales price of this 
property shall be the sole and separate property 
--- - ---~~ ~-~----~ 
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and 1noney of the plaintiff, and that she receive 
the same in full payment and satisfaction of any 
and all present or future claim of alimony from 
the defendant, LaMar Anderson, and that she 
\Vaives any and further claim to any right to ali-
mony. 
''It is further agreed that the one-half of the 
net sales price of this property hereby and here-
with given to the defendant, LaMar Anderson, 
shall be placed in trust with a trust company lo-
cated in Phoenix, Arizona, the name of which to 
be rnutually agreed upon and selected by the par-
ties hereto, and that said one-half (V2) of net 
sales price, less the costs of disbursements and 
handling of the same to be paid by said trust 
company, is to be paid directly to the said Flor-
ence Anderson at the rate of Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($250.00) per month for the purpose of 
providing support money for the minor children 
of the parties. That said payments of Two Hun-
dred Fifty Dollars ( $250.00) shall be made until 
the said one-half of said net sales prices has been 
paid to the plaintiff herein. vVhen said one-half 
of said net sales price of said property has been 
fully paid to the plain tiff as herein provided, the 
defendant, Lal\1ar Anderson, shall then con1mence 
to pay to the plaintiff, Florence Anderson, the 
sum of Two Hundred Dollars ( $200.00) per month 
for the care, support and maintenance of the 
minor children herein.'' 
(R. 8) 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the decree and of 
the stipulation and agreement as above set out, the court 
below found your appellant delinquent in the payment of 
support monies in the amount of $200.00 per month frorn 
the date of entry of the divorce deoree for an accrued 
10 
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total su1n of $7,000.00. Set off was allowed in the amount 
of $2,515.59, which represented funds donated by appel-
lant in addition to what the decree and agreement pro-
vided for. Judgment was entered in the sum of $4,484.41 
and appellant was held to be in contempt of court. 
Separation agreements are not contrary to public 
policy and they are generally enforced by the courts of 
this country and of England (see 17 Am. Jur., Divorce 
and Separation, Sec. 722 et seq.); they have been sus-
tained by this court. Johnson v. Johnson, 107 U. 147, 152 
P. 2d 426; Barraclough v. Barraclough, 100 U. 196, 111 
P. 2d 792; Jones v. Jones, 104 U. 275, 139 P. 2d 222. Our 
court said in the case of Iiall v. Hall, 111 U. 263, 177 P. 
2d 731 at 733: 
"It is true that we have held that a stipula-
tion for an alimony settlement is only a recom-
mendation to the court-Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 
275, 139 P. 2d 222-but we did not mean by that 
that it was to be given no weight at all. Absent any 
proof to the contrary the lower court should as-
sume that the parties best know their own finan-
cial standing and capabilities, and accept their 
stipulations for its face value, unless the record 
before the court obviously indicates that to ac-
cept the stipulation would not accomplish equity. 
To ignore the wishes of the parties without 
grounds for doing so clearly is an arbitrary and 
capricious act.'' 
The agreement between the parties here should be en-
forced and if there is to be subsequent change or new 
order made, it must be upon proper procedure and ·only 
after a showing by the moving party of a change in con-
ditions since the entry of the decree. Gardne'r v. Gardner, 
11 
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111 U. 286, 177 P. 2d 743. In the case of Open~haw v. 
Openshaw, 105 U. 574, 144 P. 2d 5:28, this court held that 
the right of a trial court to modify an alimony or support 
money award did not extend to installn1ents that had ac-
crued; it follows, does it not, that where, as here, under 
the terms of the decree, nothing had become due or had 
accrued, it would not be within the province of the court 
to enter judgment for a sum not owing thereunder. \Ve 
think the order for the entry of the money judgment was 
erroneous and sufficient ground for reversal of the court 
below. I-Iowever, the finding of contempt is of equal, 
if not greater, concern to your appellant. 
It has been recently held that: 
''Adjudication of 'contempt of court' may be 
prediC'ated only on contumacious disregard of 
some writ, precept, decree, order or command 
emanating from court in proper exercise of its 
jurisdiction.'' 
In re Roberts, 30 A. 2d 900, 902, 133 N.J. 
Eq. 122. 
Such a rule is so sound that it needs no further support. 
Appellant here was to begin and co·mmence to pay to re-
spondent the sum of $200 per month after his one-half 
of the proceeds from the sale of the motel property had 
been expended for the support and maintenance of the 
minor children at the rate of two hundred fifty dollars 
($250.00) per month. Respondent could or can now sell 
the property at any time she choos.es and for any price 
she can obtain and thereafter, when appellant's one-half 
of the proceeds therefrom have been applied as decreed, 
12 
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the monthly support payments shall commence as decreed. 
Otherwise, appropriate action must be taken to modify 
the decree. It is respectfully subinitted that your appel-
lant should not be held in contempt of court until and 
unless he fails to do something that has been decreed 
by the court he shall do. It is further submitted that your 
appellant has not shown a contumacious disregard of 
the decree of divorce entered against him-on the con-
trary, the undisputed evidence shows a performance by 
appellant beyond and above the requirements of said de-
cree. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the respondent herein has had, and 
indicates a desire further to have, more than she agreed 
to accept from appellant; she would retain the property, 
the income therefrom, and demand an additional monthly 
sum of $200.00 from the date of the divorce. This would 
give to the parties' Stipulation and Agreement and the 
decree of the court no weight at all. 
We submit that the trial court failed entirely to give 
effect to the plain and unambiguous terms of the Stipu-
lation and Agreement of the parties which was made, 
by incorporation, a part of the decree of divorce. The 
court below should be reversed and instructed to grant 
appellant's petition to vacate and purge your appellant 
of contempt. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRED L. FINLINSON 
Attorney for Appellant 
312 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
13 
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